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Abstract
We study the effect of quality disclosure on prices using quality tests released by the
main consumer protection agency in Germany. Both durable and non-durable consumer
products are covered, representing about 5 percent of weighted expenditures for all
products in the German CPI. Cross-section results of the price–quality relation before
quality disclosure show that higher prices are positively correlated with higher quality
for durable goods, and negatively correlated for non-durable goods; both results are in
line with theoretical models of price signaling. In the dynamic analysis, we employ a
RD-type approach around publication of the quality evaluation for identification. Results
show a positive effect of quality disclosure on prices for high quality durable products
and a negative effect for low quality products suggesting that the information improves
matching. Opposite results hold for non-durable products. Survival estimates show that
products of low quality leave the market earlier.
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1 Introduction
Consumers frequently face quality uncertainty when deciding which one of competing products
to buy. Household appliances or entertainment electronics, and products like sunscreen, child
safety seats or bicycles are groups with many competing products on the market where it
is practically impossible to make systematic comparisons for consumers. In many countries,
consumer protection agencies exist to provide an independent source of information, for example
through quality testing. We use such data to answer two main questions. Do prices signal
quality? Do quality tests from the consumer protection agency have an impact on the market
outcomes?
Asymmetric information in markets for experience goods results in inefficient market
outcomes, characterized by a domination of low quality producers. One way for firms to
mitigate the consequences of asymmetric information is to voluntarily provide information
about product quality to consumers. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) show that in
particular high-quality firms have incentives to do so (the so-called unravelling argument).
However, both the theoretical and empirical literature agree that in many instances firms lack
the incentives to voluntarily disclose information, usually because disclosure is costly (Jovanovic
(1982) and Grossman and Hart (1980)) or because it intensifies price competition (Board,
2009). In these cases consumer policy can improve welfare either through direct regulation
like minimum quality standards and mandatory disclosure or by subsidizing the acquisition of
information (Tirole, 1988).1
Consumer policy considers information provision approaches to be more efficient in reducing
information asymmetry compared to regulation, because these do not put any restrictions
on consumer choice (Beales et al. (1981) and Vickers (2004)) as compared to other forms of
regulation. The theoretical and the empirical evidence is ambiguous about the effect of increasing
consumer information on market outcomes and about the way in which this information should
be disclosed. In many countries consumer protection agencies conduct product tests that put
the performance of products along many dimensions under scrutiny. The results of such tests are
published on a regular basis in consumer magazines that usually preclude product advertisements
to preserve independence, e.g. test in Germany, Konsument in Austria, Consumer Reports
in the US, Which? in the UK, UFC-Que Choisir in France. Product quality tests are a core
activity of consumer protection agencies, also in terms of revenue, implying incentives to select
1Apart from quality disclosure there are other quality-assurance mechanisms that provide consumers with
information such as brands, experience, warranties and licensing (Dranove and Jin, 2010).
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goods according to the property of having high asymmetric information problems for consumers.
Those goods are an ideal set of products to study the effect of an information shock on prices.
Consumer test magazines potentially have a high impact, through at least two channels.
First, through direct readership and referencing in other media. The German magazine has
around 70 million visits on their website and the average number of magazine issues sold
monthly in 2019 was 368,000. Around 20,000 articles in printed newspapers, some 2,500 TV
reports and 4,500 radio reports refer to the results (Stiftung Warentest, 2019). Second, online
price comparison websites (e.g., in Germany, idealo.de and geizhals.de) provide the test results
or link to them together with information on various product characteristics. Indirect spread of
information arising through word-of-mouth is an additional way how test results can influence
consumer information.2 Therefore, as these test results reach large numbers of consumers, we
expect them to be able to have effects on prices.
In this article we evaluate whether information release about product quality has an effect
on markets for consumer goods, to provide evidence on the usefulness of such activities. Our
analysis focuses on the effect of quality information disclosure on prices and the exit of products
of different quality from the market. In the first part of the empirical analysis we test the
signaling role of prices by investigating the cross-sectional relationship between prices and
quality. These models predict a reduction of price distortions if more information is available
to consumers. Theory predicts that the direction of the implied price change depends crucially
on the durability of the product. Therefore, in the empirical analysis we distinguish between
durable and non-durable products. Our identification strategy relies on the exogenous change
of consumers’ information about quality through the publication of the test results. The data
cover many different products, tested at different points in time, allowing us to investigate the
broad effect of this intervention. We combine the test quality data with daily price data, which
allows us to identify the immediate effect of the test results on prices.
The cross-sectional results confirm the theoretical predictions of the price signaling literature.
We observe higher prices for high quality durable products, and lower prices for high quality
non-durable products before the publication of the test results. In the dynamic analysis, we
find that the immediate price effect of quality disclosure on price dynamics is an increase of
about 1 percent for high quality durable products and about 2-5 percent decrease for high
and medium quality non-durable products, which is a pattern not in line with the theoretical
2For the effect of school-quality information on school choice, Koning and van der Wiel (2013) show that the
indirect diffusion of quality results is equally important as direct exposure to the information in the newspaper
that originally published this information.
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models discussed. Looking at the survival of products after the quality grades are published, we
observe that no goods that are of the highest quality leave the market within 500 days, and that
market exit increases to about 10 percent for low quality levels. The lowest quality products,
though, leave the market at a smaller rate than all but the very highest rated products. The
results show a behavior of products of insufficient quality — in terms of price levels, as well as
for price dynamics and market exit — of imitating the behavior of good quality products.
This study contributes, first, by providing empirical evidence on the role of prices as quality
signals using a unique dataset on product quality that covers a wide range of experience goods.
We find that prices vary proportional to quality. Moreover, combining the product quality
information with daily prices allows us to test the effect of quality information on prices and
compare the results to implications of the theoretical models of price dynamics in experience
goods markets.
The second contribution relates to the empirical literature on the effects of mandatory or
third party quality disclosure on firms’ behavior. Empirical evidence on the effect of disclosure
on quality provision by firms is available mainly in the education, food/beverages and health
markets (Dranove and Jin (2010) provides a review). We provide empirical evidence on the
effect of disclosure on firms’ pricing behavior for a wide range of experience goods markets
using a common empirical background.3
Finally, our paper also contributes to the economics literature on consumer protection
(Armstrong et al. (2009), Armstrong (2011) and Vickers (2004)) by evaluating one of the main
instruments of the consumer protection agencies. Our results show that providing information
is important for consumers and helps them to make better choices. The price changes suggest
that when consumers get to know the quality of their products they substitute low quality
products with better quality products.
In the next section, we discuss the implications from the theoretical literature on information
disclosure and compare our approach to the empirical literature. In Section 3, we explain our
identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data we use. Section 5 presents the results.
Robustness checks that address modeling and data issues follow in Section 6. The article ends
3Several studies in finance evaluate regulatory and mandatory disclosure measures aiming to protect investors
and borrowers in these markets. For instance, Greenstone et al. (2006) investigate the effect of mandated
disclosure of financial information on stock returns and firm performance. Brown and Jansen (2020) look at the
effect of usury and wage garnishment laws on borrowers outcomes in the auto loan industry. Another stream of
literature investigate how stock prices react to new information, see for a more detailed discussion the work of
Hollenbacher and Yerger (2001) and Dellavigna and Pollet (2009).
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with a discussion and conclusion in Section 7.
2 Price as Quality Signal
Prices are the most fundamental instrument for firms to signal quality to consumers in experience
goods markets. Firms use either prices alone to signal quality or in combination with other
instruments. There is an extensive theoretical literature on warranties, umbrella branding and
reputation as signaling instruments. Firms can also voluntarily disclose quality information
through product certification or advertising. This discussion of the theoretical literature is
on quality signaling through prices. In the second part of this Section we review the related
empirical literature.
2.1 Models
The theoretical models on price signaling convey different predictions regarding the sign of the
correlation between price and quality. The predictions depend on, first, the nature of the good
— whether it is a durable or non-durable product — and second, on the type of producers —
whether it is a high quality versus low quality producer.
Central to the signaling literature is the mechanism that in an asymmetric information
environment high quality producers will set the price such as to distinguish themselves from
the low quality producers. Early theoretical literature shows that in monopoly markets with
incomplete information and exogenous quality, high-quality producers will signal quality by
setting a price above the full information price, whereas the low quality producers choose the
full information price. Generally, this will lead to upward price distortions. In the model
by Farrell (1981) and Wolinsky (1983) signaling works because of the presence of a share of
informed consumers; in the models of Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan
(1991) signaling is viable because the production of high quality costs more than low quality.
Daughety and Reinganum (2008) analyze price signaling in the context of imperfect competition
with horizontal product differentiation. They show that in contrast to a monopoly setting, the
equilibrium price with imperfect competition is higher than in the full-information equilibrium
for both high quality and low quality firms due to the strategic interaction between firms.
The model predicts that, when more information becomes available, prices decline to a much
greater extent compared to the monopoly situation, because both low quality and high quality
products will reduce signaling distortions. Janssen and Roy (2010) show that this result holds
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and prices signal quality even when there is no horizontal product differentiation and there is
tough price competition. An essential assumption for the predictions in Bagwell and Riordan
(1991), Daughety and Reinganum (2008) and Janssen and Roy (2010) is that high quality
products are associated with higher production costs than low quality products. These studies
argue that in practice this assumption is reasonable and relevant for most durable products.
Based on these models, we expect the following patterns for durable goods. As long as
consumers have little information about quality in experience goods markets, high quality is
signaled by high price, therefore we expect to see a monotonic positive relationship between
quality and price. Regarding price dynamics, as information about the quality diffuses, the
price distortions will be reduced and prices of both high quality and low quality products will
fall. This will materialize in particular when an exogenous shock occurs that increases the
amount of information consumers receive. However, we expect that the price reductions will be
more pronounced for high quality products because they experience the largest distortions.4
In markets for non-durable goods, repeat purchases and therefore reputation considerations
play an important role. High quality can be signaled through a low price (Tirole (1988) and
Shapiro (1983)). This can be observed especially in the case of introductory offers when a
new product is brought into the market and the producer wants to induce the customers to
try the product by means of a low price. This reputation mechanism is more important for
non-durable products because consumers can learn product quality by experience within a
relatively shorter period of time. In these cases firms will have incentives to maintain high
quality levels in order to avoid reputation damages if consumers would observe a low quality
in a given period. Moreover, because a high quality product is more likely to induce repeated
purchases, a low introductory price is more valuable to high quality producers.
The expected pattern for non-durable products will therefore be as follows. We expect a
negative relationship between price and quality for non-durable products. Prices of high quality
non-durable products will increase over time as more information becomes available.
2.2 Empirics
Early empirical studies offer mainly descriptive evidence and find a weak relationship between
price and quality (Riesz (1979), Gerstner (1985) and Curry and Riesz (1988)). Caves and Greene
4There are also models where quality is endogenous and firms set a price premium for high quality (models
of quality-guaranteeing price). We focus on changes in firms behavior in a short period surrounding the event of
the publication. During this short period, quality can be assumed to be fixed and we abstract from quality
changes and reputation effects.
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(1996) analyze the use of prices as signals of quality measuring the amount of information
consumers hold based on survey data. The analysis relies on cross-section data for some 200
products evaluated in the Consumer Reports. They find that price–quality correlation depends
on the amount and type of information consumers hold. The results suggests that prices serve
only as signals for products of frequent but unimportant purchase or for products where brand
is important for the consumer choice.
A growing literature investigates the effect of online reputation mechanisms on sellers’ be-
havior by exploiting the fact that in an online environment the researcher knows the information
sets of both buyers and sellers. However, these studies rely on buyer reviews as an indicator of
quality or reputation. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) show that a negative feedback received by a
seller on eBay is associated with a decrease in price and increase in sales. A related study that
also looks at the eBay feedback mechanism is provided by Jin and Kato (2006). They conducted
a field experiment and let professionals evaluate baseball cards in order to obtain a quality
measure. They find evidence of fraud. Some sellers claim high quality and less-experienced
buyers pay high prices without receiving the high quality claimed. Reputation does not solve
the problem; while it helps consumers to identify the truthful producers, more reputable sellers
do not offer better quality. Lewis (2011) looks at the effect of voluntary disclosure of product
characteristics on prices. He finds that the degree of information that sellers reveal about the
product in terms of the number of photos and text descriptions of products strongly influences
prices. These studies exploit changes in the reputation system of eBay for identification but
do not explicitly consider an exogenous increase in the amount of information consumers hold.
Focusing on the used car market, Hollenbacher and Yerger (2001) look at the effect of Consumer
Reports’ reliability evaluations on resale prices, finding that used vehicles that belong to the
compact/sub-compact category experience a price decrease following a negative evaluation
relative to other products.
Quality information disclosure can also affect sellers’ market exit behavior and quality
adjustment. Cabral and Hortacsu (2010) argue that in an anonymous market one should expect
an effect of product ratings on exit, because rational sellers change their behavior just before
leaving or are more likely to leave after having received the negative feedback. This hypothesis
is confirmed. They find that sellers with lower reputation are more likely to exit. Klein et al.
(2016), though, do not find evidence that an increase in market transparency increases sellers’
exit. For a change in market transparency, they interpret as a natural experiment the change
of eBay’s settings to display seller information by default. Their results suggest a reduction
in moral hazard and sellers that improve their performance in a more transparent market
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environment.
Overall the empirical evidence on quality information provision after disclosure is mixed,
also when considering evidence from settings other than an online environment. Jin and Leslie
(2003) investigate the effect of mandatory disclosure of quality in the restaurant market. They
find that the display of grade cards causes restaurants to make hygiene quality improvements
and reduces the incidence of food-borne diseases. Looking at the health sector, Dranove et al.
(2003) in their review show that in general there is no improvement in quality of the service
offered by doctors. In health markets, rather than quality improvements, obligatory information
provision has negative consequences on consumer welfare because providers engage in selective
behavior and refuse to treat severely ill patients. For instance, Werner and Asch (2005) show
that the incidence of cardiac surgery for minority patients declined after the publication of
quality report cards.
Some studies investigate the impact of other disclosure mechanisms on consumer demand.
Mathios (2000) exploits the change in regulation which made voluntary nutritive information
disclosure mandatory for salad. They find that prior to regulation, the low-fat salads (high
quality) were more likely to voluntarily disclose information and there is a significant effect of
nutritive elements disclosure on consumer choice. Freedman et al. (2012) investigate the effect
of product recalls of children’s toys that violate product safety and find industry and brand
effects. Koning and van der Wiel (2013) find a positive effect of school-quality information
published in a newspaper on school choice in the Netherlands.
An alternative to systematic quality evaluation by a consumer protection agency is product
ratings either through consumers or through experts. In Anderson and Magruder (2012), the
effect of eBay ratings on restaurant customer flows is largest for those restaurants on which
there is a lack of information from other sources. Studies on the impact of expert reviews on
consumer demand are Reinstein and Snyder (2005) for movies, and Friberg and Grönqvist
(2012) and Hilger et al. (2011) for wine. Ackerberg (2003) and Ippolito and Mathios (1990)
show that the information provided through advertising affects consumer demand. Overall,
these studies conclude that consumers react to quality information and substitute away from
low quality products towards high quality products, provided that the information is easy to
understand and contains new information.
Relying on consumer or expert ratings as an indicator of quality gives less clear and more
subjective quality measures. Consumer ratings may be manipulated. Expert reviews may be
appropriate only for specific settings such as for wine, restaurants, theatres, or books; they may
be influenced by personal taste; they can be hard or impossible to reproduce. In contrast to
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these studies or to studies that investigate voluntary disclosure of information by firms, we rely
on an objective and exogenous measure of quality provided by an independent agency as the
source of information. Product test procedures are documented in detail together with the
test results. The German consumer protection agency is financed primarily through the sale of
their publications and receives some government subsidies. Financing through advertisements
is prohibited.
The behavioral economics literature emphasize that whether consumers react to quality
ratings or not depends on the amount of attention they pay to the information provided
(Dellavigna and Pollet, 2009). Pope (2009) shows that the consumer reaction depends on the
reported measures of quality and recommends that these should be easier to understand, given
the limited cognitive ability of consumers. The information provided by the test magazine
from which we collect our data is easy to comprehend. It provides a lot of detail on testing
procedures and tested characteristics, but also a single number aggregating all results for a
product that resembles school grades (a sample can be seen in Figure A.1).
The empirical studies on dynamic effects of quality disclosure focus on single markets, usually
exploiting either the nature of information in online platforms or a change in the regulatory
environment. Our study considers a wide range of experience goods markets and the sample
allows us to distinguish between durable products and non-durable products in a unified setting.
3 Setting and Research Design
Our identification strategy exploits the exogenous increase in the amount of information
consumers hold and the quasi-random timing of the quality disclosure to identify the effect of
quality on prices. Identification relies on price comparison of the products within the interval
of [−105,+105] (+/- 15 weeks) days around quality evaluation. The 105 days window is a
somewhat arbitrary compromise of having a window that is large enough to have precision
in the estimation and having enough products that have a long enough time series of data
available. We will address this in a robustness check below. For identification to be valid, two
important conditions have to be met. First, test results are not communicated before the event.
Second, quality is stable within the window.
The timing of quality disclosure is coupled with the publication date of the test magazine.
Concretely, the publication date is defined as the day when the test results are published online
and sent out to subscribers and newsstands. This happens 2 to 12 days before the first of the
month of the issue in question, with the precise date available for every monthly issue. The
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product categories that are tested are not communicated in advance to consumers or producers.
Products are bought anonymously to avoid that producers know that their products are being
tested.5 Producers also cannot influence the choice of the topics or ask the consumer protection
agency to test their products. Free sample products from producers are never asked for, nor
used or accepted. Testing is sometimes outsourced to independent testing institutes, which
remain anonymous to the public and producers and conform to the same testing standards of
anonymous purchase. Producers are consulted only after the products have been tested to ask
them if, according to their opinion, all relevant product components are incorporated in the
test, but no (preliminary) test results of their products are communicated before publication of
the magazine (Stiftung Warentest (2014)).
There is a large range of products and market segments tested and no information on the
products tested is published before the magazine appears. Therefore, we consider the choice
of products in a particular issue of the magazine as quasi-random. The arrival of the quality
information on the publication date is treated as an information discontinuity about quality.
Absence of preliminary disclosure of the products to be tested lead to ignorance of producers
about being tested, which is important for the stability of quality. Producers do not know if and
when they are tested, and cannot tie quality adjustments to being tested. The event window is
also relatively short for changing quality after the test results are published, and in particular
for consumers to then also learn about possible changes in quality. Most products in the sample
have detailed specifications, model names and numbers and it may be that changing the quality
in many cases would result in the creation of a new product and model name/number. For
these reasons, at that time when the event window starts, the producers cannot influence the
quality of the product, meaning exogeneity of the quality measure.
The published test results provide a systematic evaluation of quality for a large number of
products across different markets. They provide standardized measures of quality that are easy
to compare across producers and easy to understand for consumers. Quality is measured on a
wide range of objectively verifiable characteristics. Test results and the structure of the timing
of information flows lend themselves to significantly increase the degree of information.
5Detailed information on the test procedure can be found here: https://www.test.de/unternehmen/
testablauf-5017344-0/
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4 Background and Data
Stiftung Warentest is the main consumer protection agency in Germany. It provides quality result
tables in the monthly magazine called test. Its stated aim is to provide objective information
about products and services that improve consumers’ judgement about the products, based
on systematic and reproducible testing. Stiftung Warentest is a non-profit foundation. Per
its statutes, product advertisements are prohibited, to maintain independence of information
from firms. Revenues are generated by selling magazines and other consumer information
publications. Losses are covered by the government (2019: about 5 percent of total revenues).
For most products and characteristics, a consumer cannot judge the products even after
purchase because of lack of knowledge or expertise to evaluate the technical or chemical aspects,
in particular in comparison with other products. For instance, consumers are typically unable
to judge whether a face cream contains dangerous ingredients that are detrimental to his health
or if products have safety problems; or easily measure TV display quality under different light
environments and viewing angles.
We use all 36 issues over the years 2016, 2017 and 2018 for a total of 230 tests for which the
prices are available on a price comparison website.6 Within these 230 tests, the majority of
tests is for durables, and in particular many electric and electronic goods: household appliances,
entertainment electronics, computers, tools, etc. Examples are notebooks, mobile phones,
battery lawn mowers, speakers, dishwashers, light bulbs, and coffee makers. Non-electronic
goods in the sample are for example creams for hand/feet/face, sunscreen, child safety seats,
bicycles, or toothpaste. The quality of the products is evaluated along several dimensions
that vary from test to test, depending on the product in question. The focus is how well the
product works to fulfill the primary use of the product. For durables or electronic products,
additional test dimensions can be safety, durability, ease or comfort of use, equipment, technical
functionality, power consumption, noise etc. For non-durables the tests evaluate — besides
performance — harmful substances, packaging, declared information etc. Sometimes these
dimensions also include norms already defined by laws, but where ex ante proof is not available
to consumers that producers actually comply. These detailed dimensions each receive grades
for each product, from which a weighted average is calculated to obtain a total grade for each
product.
6This is the vast majority of tests in the magazine. The main categories usually not on the price comparison
website are food products and tests for service quality. Examples for tests of the latter are: home care
intermediation service, service quality of online pharmacies, online dating agencies, or tour operators for
traveling.
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The 230 tests cover 2,736 tested products, which were matched to price series data from the
German site geizhals.de, which provides price comparisons from different sellers. Prices are the
daily minimum price offered per day. Products in the magazine test are clearly specified with
product names that makes confusing similar products almost impossible. Pictures frequently
available both in test and on geizhals.de further helped in identifying matches. The overall
matching rate is 85.6 percent, and the products share for those ending up in the estimation
sample with data available for the estimation window of +/-105 days is 61.1 percent (1,672
products). Note that this matched sample is not selected on quality (see Table 3).
The consumer protection agency, by its raison d’être, has an incentive to select those
products with the highest asymmetric information problems for consumers. Therefore, the
goods represented in the tests, and hence our sample, are by construction not a random sample
of all products, but chosen for the presence of asymmetric information. We cannot quantify
the extent of asymmetric information, but we can quantify coverage of our data in terms of
representation in the CPI basket-of-goods.
We have mapped the products that are in the tests of our sample to the 645 lowest-level
categories in the weighting pattern of the German Consumer Price Index (Destatis, 2019).
Our data cover about 1/9 of these categories (69/645). Table 1 shows the names of these 69
categories and the number of products falling into each category from our sample. The Table
is sorted in descending order by the size of the CPI weight of the CPI category. Clearly, the
tested products falling into each CPI category are not all products feasible for the category,
but we find this to be a useful way to illustrate the representativeness and coverage of our data.
Summing up all the weights, without counting any product twice, the products cover about 5
percent of the whole German CPI baskets of goods (47.7 of 1,000).
Table A.1 in the Appendix gives additional insight by looking at the CPI-category aggregates
at the 2- and 3-digit level. There are 12 main level (2-digit) categories in the weighting pattern
of the German CPI (Column (2)), of which 8 are covered. Column (3) shows the weights,
which sum to 1,000 for the whole basket. Column (5) shows the 3-digit subcategories for those
main categories that are present in our estimation sample. From those 31 subcategories, 16 are
covered. Column (7) shows the lowest-level weights covered by our data, summed up at the
3-digit level, which again gives the value of 47.7 of 1,000. Column (8) repeats the display of the
number of products in our sample that fall into that 3-digit level.
As a further point of reference for the weighted expenditures covered by our dataset, we
calculated the relation between the cost of the CPI basket of goods and GDP. GDP in Germany

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2: Quality grades non-/durables and by sample
Grade 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Verbal Very good Good Satisfactory Sufficient Insufficient
Full sample 100 1,410 818 230 178 2,736
durables 77 1,273 773 224 156 2,503
non-durables 23 137 45 6 22 233
Dynamic sample 38 897 535 130 72 1,672
durables 37 860 522 129 66 1,614
non-durables 1 37 13 1 6 58
Notes: Number of products by quality result from the product tests. For each grade, one line reports the number
of durables and one line for non-durables. The top panel shows the Full sample which covers all products of the
tests we have included. The bottom panel covers the subsample of products where we have sufficient price series
data for the Dynamic sample that uses +/- 105 days of price data around the event.
expenditures for housing (incl. energy costs and repair/maintenance), which were 908 euro per
private household and month and in the CPI weighting scheme account for a share of 0.3247.
There were 41.378 million private households in Germany in 2018. Therefore, the basket of
goods covers
12 · 908/0.3247 · 41.378 = 1,388.5
billion euro, from which we derive the coverage of the basket of goods in relation to GDP as
1,388.5/3,388.2 = 0.4098. This means, the 5 percent coverage of the basket of goods of our
sample corresponds to about 2 percent of GDP.
4.1 Cross-section and dynamic sample
The sample with all 2,736 products from the tests will be referred to as Full sample henceforth
and used for the cross-section estimations. For our RD-approach we need price data for each
day +/-105 days around the event. The sample of products where we also have sufficient price
series data will be referred to as Dynamic sample. Moving from Full to Dynamic, the number
of products contracts because of missing price history data on the price comparison website.
Table 2 shows the observations subdivided by type of sample, by durability, and by ordinal
grade from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) achieved in the product test. Durability differentiation is highly
important because the predictions for price setting and its response after quality revelation
depend on it.
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For the data analysis, we use the more detailed subcategorisation of products from the
magazine. Product groups in the magazine refer to a type of product, like a TV set, a washing
machine, or child helmet. Frequently, these product groups are subdivided when a particular
characteristic makes the products weaker substitutes. For example, washing machines that are
front-loaders vs. top-loaders; or, child helmets fitting a particular age group; or, TV sets of 55
inch screen diagonal vs. 65 inch. We use the lowest-level characteristic by which test tables are
organized to make products within a test comparable. This is relevant for the cross-section
analysis; in the dynamic analysis, the subcategories are eliminated by the product fixed-effects
we include. Table 3 shows summary statistics for the Full and the Dynamic sample. The first
line shows that there are 365 product groups by subcategories in the Full sample. 327 tests
remain in the Dynamic sample.
Over 90 percent of the products are durables (Table 3). The average number of products
per test goes down from 7.5 in the Full to 5.1 in the Dynamic sample because of missing price
series data. Price summary statistics are shown, and prices relative to the mean test price; the
latter will be the dependent variable in the regressions to avoid dominance of more expensive
product groups in the price reaction regressions. Prices of the products vary widely by type of
product, from below 1 euro for products measured in units of 100 milliliters (e.g., all sorts of
creams), to up to 4,000 euro for some TV sets, E-bikes and some types of cameras. The mean
price is 377 euro for Full, with a median of 200 euro; for Dynamic, it is 431 euro and 262 euro.
The difference comes partly from the relative reduction of the usually cheaper non-durables,
which have smaller representation on the price comparison website.
Each product receives a numeric aggregate quality value in steps of 0.1 from 0.5 to 5.5, which
is derived from the test categories — but without being influenced by the price of the product.
Table 3 shows a mean quality of 2.7. The quality results are mapped into five ordinal grades
of quality by Stiftung Warentest: Very good (0.5-1.5), Good (1.6-2.5), Satisfactory (2.6-3.5),
Sufficient (3.6-4.5) and Insufficient (4.6-5.5). For our empirical analysis, we use the five ordinal
grades for differentiation of quality. The ordinal grades are easier to process and remember by
consumers, and may be more relevant to them. The line History refers to the time in years
that the product was listed on the price comparison website before the publication day of the
test result. The mean is 1.3 years for durables and 3.7 years, the medians are 0.8 and 3.9 years.
Future measures the time in years that the product was listed after the event. This variable is
censored for all products still on the market when our data extraction ended. To avoid bias,
we uniformly apply censoring the variable Future at 500 days (1.37 years). Quartile 1 reveals
that most products remain on the market for 500 days after the event; only 6.8 percent of the
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Figure 1: Price and Quality
Durables Non-durables
←− higher quality / lower quality −→ ←− higher quality / lower quality −→
Notes: Price–quality plot for durable products (left) and non-durable products (right). Prices are divided by
the mean price of the products in the test. Quality is centered around the mean quality of the products in a
test. The middle (red) line shows the moving average of relative prices with a symmetric window containing
20 percent of the sample. The lines above and below (grey) the moving average show the basic 95 percent
confidence interval from 5,000 iterations of bootstrapping the moving average values. For the border areas,
where the calculation of the moving average relies on an increasingly truncated sample, the moving average and
95-percent-CI-lines are shown as dashed lines.
products (132/1,948) exit until day 500; all of the exits are durables. For the exit analysis in
Section 5, we use all observations with exit data, not only those with data available for the
+/-105-window. Therefore, there are 1,948 observations here instead of 1,672 in the Full sample.
Figure 1 illustrates the cross-section relationship of price and quality for durables (left) and
non-durables (right). Because of the variability in prices, the Figure shows prices expressed
relative to the test group mean. Quality is measured as the difference from the median quality
of each product’s test, which is better suited to preserve any tendency between price and quality
in the cross-section.7 Figure 1 includes a moving average which for each data point contains a
symmetric window with one fifth of the dataset, together with a bootstrapped basic 95 percent
confidence interval for the moving average. A lower grade means higher quality. For durables,
this yields a clear negative relationship in the area where no truncation for the moving average
calculation takes place (solid lines). For non-durables, the pattern is more complex, with a
larger part showing a positive relationship.
7For example, all products in a test could be relatively good, and therefore all prices be relatively high,
which would dilute a negative price-quality relationship when we divide by mean product price only. In the
regressions below, we will control for test group fixed effects.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Sample Variable N Mean Std. dev. Q1 Median Q3
Full sample
Tests (N=365) Products per test 7.50 4.50 4.00 6.00 10.00
Products Price 2,736 377.10 486.81 61.37 199.75 516.23
durables 2,503 411.45 495.15 92.21 238.70 556.88
non-durables 233 8.13 15.51 0.87 1.96 7.60
Price/Price 2,736 1.00 0.47 0.71 0.95 1.21
durables 2,503 1.00 0.41 0.73 0.95 1.20
non-durables 233 1.00 0.89 0.26 0.73 1.42
Quality 2,736 2.68 0.90 2.10 2.40 3.00
durables 2,503 2.70 0.89 2.10 2.50 3.00
non-durables 233 2.46 1.02 1.80 2.10 2.90
History (years) 1,948 1.42 1.59 0.55 0.85 1.65
durables 1,877 1.33 1.50 0.54 0.81 1.56
non-durables 71 3.72 2.01 2.02 3.89 5.50
Future (years) 1,948 1.34 0.16 1.37 1.37 1.37
durables 1,877 1.33 0.17 1.37 1.37 1.37
non-durables 71 1.37 0.00 1.37 1.37 1.37
Dynamic sample
Tests (N=327) Products per test 5.11 3.60 2.00 4.00 7.00
Products Price 1,672 431.74 489.55 111.07 262.04 595.49
durables 1,614 447.04 491.45 122.64 276.29 616.91
non-durables 58 6.03 8.44 1.10 2.77 8.24
Price/Price 1,672 1.02 0.43 0.72 0.96 1.23
durables 1,614 1.01 0.41 0.72 0.95 1.22
non-durables 58 1.29 0.76 0.60 1.20 1.82
Quality 1,672 2.63 0.79 2.10 2.40 3.00
durables 1,614 2.64 0.78 2.10 2.50 3.00
non-durables 58 2.50 1.02 1.80 2.10 3.00
History (years) 1,672 1.48 1.58 0.59 0.89 1.70
durables 1,614 1.40 1.51 0.59 0.87 1.61
non-durables 58 3.77 1.98 2.43 3.90 5.54
Future (years) 1,672 1.35 0.11 1.37 1.37 1.37
durables 1,614 1.35 0.11 1.37 1.37 1.37
non-durables 58 1.37 0.00 1.37 1.37 1.37
Notes: The top panel contains the values for the Full sample, the bottom panel for the Dynamic sample, which
is constrained by the availability of price time series. The lines with Tests in Column (1) refer to observations
on the test level, those with Products refer to the level of products in the tests. History reports the time in years
that a product is recorded on the price comparison website before the test publication date; Future reports the
years the product remains listed on the website afterwards. The variable Future is censored at 500 days (1.37
years). History and Future have fewer observations in the Full sample because of non-availability on the price
comparison website. Monetary values are in euro of January 2016.
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5 Results
First, we estimate the cross-section relationship between quality and prices before quality
information is published. This is a test of the main result of the signaling literature that firms
signal quality through prices in experience goods markets. The second part of the results
consists of the analysis of the Dynamic sample to answer what the price response is after
the quality disclosure event, differentiated by quality. Following the theoretical literature, we
differentiate between durables and non-durables. Then, we use Kaplan-Meier-estimates to see
if quality affects market exit of products.
5.1 Cross-section relationship






γg · 1[Gradeij = g] + νij (1)
where the left-hand side denotes the price of product i in test j over the mean price of the
products in the test. Prices used are those recorded before the tests are performed by Stiftung
Warentest. γg are coefficients for the grades from 2 to 5 expressed as dummy variables, with
grade 1 as the reference group.8 Based on the discussion in Section 2.1, we expect high quality
durable goods to have on average higher prices. For durable goods, reputation concerns play a
less important role. For non-durable goods, we expect high quality goods to have lower prices.
Note that we expect the coefficients γg to be negative for durable products and positive for
non-durable products, because high quality means a low value in the test grade.
Figure 2 shows the estimates for the grades from 2 (second best quality) to 5 (worst quality)
for durables (left) and non-durables (right); the numerical results are displayed in Table A.2.
The left graph in the Figure shows that there is a strong positive relationship between quality
and the relative price for durables. Products of grade 2 display the same negative tendency
but the estimate is insignificant; for grade 3, prices are about one quarter lower, for grade 4,
about one third. For products with the worst grade, prices increase relative to grade 4. For
non-durable products, as shown on the right graph, the opposite pattern is observed. Relative
prices are higher for lower quality products, except for the worst grade. Relative prices are 75
percent higher for grade 3 and twice as high for grade 4, before they slightly decrease relative
8We also included βj , test fixed-effects, but the F-tests for both durables and non-durables where highly
insignificant. This may not be surprising after dividing by the mean price in the test.
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Figure 2: Price and quality regression coefficients and CI
Durables Non-durables
←− higher quality / lower quality −→ ←− higher quality / lower quality −→
Notes: Regression estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals from regression of the prices relative to the test
mean prices on grade dummies. Durable products are left, non-durable products right. Products of grade 1
(Very good) are the reference group.
to grade 4 for the worst grade.
In sum, both the descriptive results in Figure 1 and the results from the cross-sectional
regressions confirm the theoretical predictions and suggest that prices fulfill a signaling role in
an asymmetric information environment. The results show a positive relationship between prices
and quality for durable goods; and the opposite pattern for non-durable products. Products of
the worst quality imitate prices of products with higher quality. This makes the products of very
bad quality difficult to distinguish from products of middle quality for consumers when simply
relying on price. These results are largely consistent with separating equilibria of signaling
models.
5.2 The Effect of Information on Prices
To investigate the informational content of the disclosure event, we apply an RD-like approach
around the event of quality disclosure. Our implementation is similar to Kreiner et al. (2020).
We use a dummy with parameter γ to estimate the event effect for each ordinal quality grade
result. The publication of the test results defines the event. The basic specification which we








k + δ · 1[0 ≤ t ≤ 4] +Diµ+ εit (2)
with the dependent variable given by the price of each product relative to its price at the
beginning of the event window. t is measured in relative time, going from -105 to 105 days after
the event for each product i. αk fits a fourth-order polynomial. δ makes it possible to allow for
a time lag for the impact of the revealed quality information on prices. The time lag includes
the day the results are published (t = 0), and 4 days afterwards. We view this as a possibility
for the market to absorb the new information, in particular because it is assumed to take about
2-3 days to deliver the magazine to subscribers. Di is a product fixed effect dummy. Based on
the signaling literature we expect the parameter γ to be negative for high quality durable goods,
because reducing information asymmetry about quality reduces the necessity to distort high
quality products’ prices upward. For high quality non-durable goods, we expect price increases
— a positive estimate for γ — because of reduced necessity to distort prices downward.
Figure 3 shows the result of the polynomial and the shift of mean prices at publication/arrival
of the quality information on the market. Grade 2 durable products, which have the largest
sample size, exhibit a very strong and clear upward shift in mean price after the event, and
a monotonic, almost linear downward trend both before and after the event. This downward
trend, both before and after the event, is a well-known pattern in the theoretical literature of
pricing of experience good (Bergemann and Välimäki (2006)). The upward shift is significant
— see Table 4, Column (2), top panel — and estimated as .877 percentage points. A similar
pattern holds for products of quality grade 1, with .787 percentage points upward shift. The
effect for products of grade 3 is much lower, at .295 percentage points. For grade 4, we find a
negative price effect with -.64 percentage points. For grade 5 products the effect is positive,
which, as in the cross section relationship, reverses the expected price–quality relationship; it is
insignificant, though. The differential effect of the event between the highest (grade 2) and the
lowest (grade 4) significant effects is .877− (−.636) ≈ 1.5 percentage points.
For non-durables, shown in the graphs of the right column of Figure 3, and in the bottom
panel of the regression results in Table 4, all significant results are the opposite of those for
durables: for grade 2, the price effect is -1.6 percentage points, for grade 3 it is about -5
percentage points, and for grade 5 it is 1.4 percentage points. We include grade 1 and grade 4
for completeness, but give smaller weight in the interpretation to these results, because they
are based on the time series of a single product each.
Overall, these estimates from the RD-model give mixed results compared to the predictions
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of the signaling literature regarding price dynamics. We see a significant increase in mean
prices for durable products of very good, good and satisfactory quality, instead of a price
decrease because of the reduction in information asymmetry. Also, we see a decrease in price for
non-durables of satisfactory quality. These findings indicate that test results improve matching
and consumers switch from low quality products to better quality products. The pattern of
price changes for non-durables does not confirm theory, where high quality producers would
start with low prices and when consumers become more informed, they would increase prices
over time. An interesting observation is made for products of insufficient quality. Their prices
rise both in the case of durable and non-durable products. One possible explanation is that
producers of bad quality may imitate pricing of higher quality products to target consumers
that are not aware of the product test results and that still rely on price as a signal. Hence,
these producers exploit the uninformed to increase prices and imitate the behavior of good
quality products.
5.3 Market exit
Quality information disclosure can affect not only price setting, but also the decision to keep
the product on the market. Bad test results could induce producers to take those products off
the market. Because our price series are naturally censored, with more frequent censoring to
be expected for younger products, we introduce a common censoring for all products at 500
days after the publication of the test. The design of the RD-window implies that the minimum
survival time after the test was 105 days. We extend the data basis for the analysis in this
Subsection to all observations that have market presence after the event, which corresponds to
the 1,948 observations (see variable Future in Table 3).
Figure 4 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by grade on the left graph. Mostly, the
hypothesis that a worse grade means earlier exit is confirmed. There is not a single exit for
the products with the best quality, grade 1. Intermediate and very similar exit rates occur for
grade 2 and 3, and an even higher rate for grade 4. Only grade 5, the worst grade, stands out
from this negative survival–quality relationship, with no exits for about half of the time span
considered and then ending up with the second-lowest exit rate.
Grade 4 and 5 have large confidence intervals for the Kaplan-Meier estimates that overlap
with the point estimates of the other grades. The right graph of Figure 4 has the two groups,
grade 2 and 3, which display very similar exit patterns, pooled together to show their 95 percent
confidence interval in relation to the other grades. Grade 4 lies outside the confidence band;
grade 5 approaches the band once exits start, but also lies outside the grade-2/3 band most of
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Notes: Mean prices, each product’s price relative to its price at relative day -105. The black line is the result of
the event estimation. The left column is for durable goods, the right column for non-durables. Each row of
graphs is for one grade, starting from the best grade, 1, and going down to the worst grade, 5.
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Table 4: Regression results for RD estimate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 Grade 5
Durables
1[t > 0] .00787** .00877** .00295* -.00636** .00305
(.00255) (.00091) (.00130) (.00231) (.00326)
t -.00015** -.00041** -.00039** -6.8e-05 -.00024**
(4.2e-05) (1.6e-05) (2.2e-05) (4.3e-05) (5.3e-05)
t2 -2.9e-06** 1.3e-06** 8.1e-07* 1.9e-07 -1.1e-06
(5.0e-07) (2.5e-07) (3.4e-07) (5.6e-07) (7.1e-07)
t3 -4.7e-09 5.5e-11 2.9e-09 -2.2e-08** 7.0e-09
(3.9e-09) (1.9e-09) (2.4e-09) (4.2e-09) (5.4e-09)
t4 1.9e-10** -5.0e-11 -2.7e-11 -7.6e-11 3.2e-11
(5.3e-11) (2.8e-11) (3.7e-11) (5.9e-11) (7.4e-11)
1[0 ≤ t ≤ 4] -.00015 -.00802** -.0018 -.0043 -.00656
(.00313) (.00137) (.00189) (.00258) (.00362)
Constant .99504** .94522** .96051** .97354** .98803**
(.00156) (.00056) (.00077) (.00137) (.00190)
N 7,807 181,460 110,142 27,219 13,926
Non-durables
1[t > 0] .07699* -.01637** -.04989** .01193** .01383
(.03555) (.00614) (.01224) (.00352) (.01189)
t -.0008 .00043** -.00024 -.00032** .00013
(.00042) (.0001) (.00016) (6.0e-05) (.00023)
t2 -1.4e-05** 2.8e-07 8.3e-06** -1.9e-06 -2.0e-06
(5.2e-06) (1.4e-06) (2.0e-06) (1.1e-06) (3.5e-06)
t3 6.9e-08* -4.8e-08** 1.3e-08 7.9e-08** 2.7e-08
(3.4e-08) (1.1e-08) (1.3e-08) (6.3e-09) (2.7e-08)
t4 1.1e-09* 1.0e-10 -8.4e-10** 7.8e-10** -2.0e-10
(4.6e-10) (1.6e-10) (1.8e-10) (1.1e-10) (4.1e-10)
1[0 ≤ t ≤ 4] -.08934* .00645 .03698** -.00106 -.03217**
(.03542) (.0067) (.01124) (.0033) (.01079)
Constant .99291** 1.0002** .98499** .99002** 1.0835**
(.00821) (.00356) (.00533) (.00174) (.00738)
N 211 7,807 2,743 211 1,266
Notes: Each Column shows the regression results for the RD model for one grade, from best (grade 1) to worst
grade (grade 5). The top panel is for durable goods, the bottom panel for non-durables. 1[t > 0], the main
variable of interest, is put into bold face except where the estimate only relies on a single product. Product-fixed
effects are included. Standard errors are clustered on calendar days. Standard errors are in parentheses below
the coefficients. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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Figure 4: Kaplan-Meier survival by grades
All grades Aggregate Grade 2 & 3 with CI
Notes: The left graph shows Kaplan-Meier survival estimates by grade. The right graph pools grade 2 and 3
together and adds its 95 percent confidence interval.
the time, and also at the end of the censored time span. The pattern fits the idea that quality
disclosure from the consumer protection agency is relevant, reduces asymmetric information
and improves the average quality of products in the market, because bad products leave the
market. Only for the worst grade products there is an effect reversion.
6 Robustness
Two pseudo-events are shown as evidence that the results are not driven by other factors than
the event. Afterwards, we relax and vary some of the modelling choices that may drive the
results. One varies the window length, the next one leaves out of the analysis observations
immediately before and after the event, and finally, we experiment with different orders of the
polynomial in time.
6.1 Pseudo-events
As a robustness check against confounding pricing-relevant artifacts, we create two pseudo-events.
First, a pseudo-event predated to four months before the publication of the test magazine;
second, predating one year. A shift of the event by four months is as close as possible to
the actual event when shifting by full months, without the possibility that the actual event
influences the results (105≈3.5 months). With the shift of one year we target to exclude any
season-of-the-year effects that could affect pricing in general, or of a product group, or of a
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Notes: Mean prices, each product’s price relative to its price at relative day -105. The black line is the result of
the event estimation. The left column shows the pseudo-events four months before the actual event (top panel)
and one year before the actual event (bottom panel). All four graphs are for durables of grade 2. The sample of
products differs from the main grade-2-durables results (Figure 3) and between the pseudo-events because of
data availability of historical price series. To avoid sample selection effects, we reestimate each actual event
with the subsample of products in the corresponding pseudo-event; the results for the actual event of quality
publication with the same subsample as in the corresponding pseudo-event are shown in the right column. The
top panel contains 609 products (128,499 obs.), the bottom panel 216 products (45,576 obs.).
specific product.
Figure 5 shows the two pseudo-events in the left column, compared to the actual event in the
right column. Durables of grade 2, which is the largest group and displays the strongest effect
of the event, are used in this robustness check. Because the number of products in the pseudo
events is not the same as in the actual event due to price history data availability, we present
for each pseudo-event also an additional graph for the actual event with the corresponding
products to make the results more comparable. For the 4-months pseudo-event, the effect is
close to zero and insignificant. Table 5 gives the numerical estimates for this pseudo-event in
Column (1), and the actual event estimate for the same sample of products in Column (2). For
the 1-year pseudo-event, the point estimate is a quarter of the actual event and also insignificant
(Table 5, Column (3) and (4)). The low estimates and their insignificance for the pseudo-events
support the validity of our event approach.
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Table 5: Price effects for pseudo-events
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pseudo-event Actual event Pseudo-event Actual event
Predate 4 months (Pseudo subsample) Predate 1 year (Pseudo subsample)
1[t > 0] -.00038 .01076** .00311 .01270**
(.00108) (.00117) (.00180) (.00227)
N 128,499 128,499 45,576 45,576
Notes: Price effects for predating to a pseudo-event four months and one year before the publication of the
quality results. The specification is the same as in the main results, with the same covariates and clustering of
the standard errors on calendar days. All four columns are for durables of grade 2. Column (1) shows the price
effect for the pseudo-event 4 months before the actual event, Column (2) the main result constrained to the
identical products as in the regression of Column (1); Column (3) contains the price effect for the pseudo-event
1 year before the actual event, Column (3) the main result constrained to the identical products as in Column
(4). Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
6.2 Window length
The choice of the window length to be +/- 105 days (+/- 15 weeks) is a result of having a
time span that is sufficiently long to estimate the event effect with precision and not losing too
many products due to missing daily prices for longer time series. Also, 105 is just a multiple of
7, which was chosen as a way to preclude any artifacts from breaking weekly frequencies. In
this Subsection, we vary the window length by changing it in units of full weeks. In particular,
Figure 6 shows the event effect by grade and durability for variations of the window length
from +/-10 weeks (+/-70 days) to +/-20 weeks (+/-140 days), instead of the original +/-15
weeks (in total, 11 window-lengths).
Most of the results are within the 95 percent confidence interval of the original estimate
for the group. The solid circles shows the original estimates and the solid lines the confidence
interval for each original estimate. Each grey plus-sign represents one alternative estimate for
each of the 11 window-lengths from 10 to 20 weeks. The hollow triangles show the mean of
the 11 estimates per grade/durability (the 11 grey plusses, one for each variant of the window
length). The sample size is different from the original estimates, because with increasing
window length, the number of products with missing daily prices increases. Within the results
in Figure 6, the number of observations is kept constant at the level implied by the largest
window length, +/-20 weeks. Below each grade in Figure 6 is shown the share of products
that remains in this robustness check. For products of grade 3 we observe that the alternative
estimates lie outside the original confidence interval. These does not necessarily imply that
the results for products of sufficient quality are not robust to the window length. Note that
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←− higher quality / lower quality −→ ←− higher quality / lower quality −→
Quality grade (Share of products covered)
Notes: On the left, for each grade of durable products, the event effect is measured by using a window from
length 10 to length 20 weeks instead of the original 15 weeks (105 days window). The solid circle and the
symmetric error bars around it show the original event estimate and its 95 percent CI. Grey plus-signs represent
one alternative estimate for each of the 11 window-lengths from 10 to 20. Black hollow triangles show the mean
of the 11 alternative estimates. The samples become smaller when longer windows are considered; the sample
size is fixed at the longest window length of 20 weeks. The percentage numbers below each grade show the
sample that remains relative to the original sample. On the right, the same analysis is shown for non-durables.
only 85 percent of grade 3 products remain in the subsample when varying the window length.
Moreover, when one looks at the smaller window lengths which are not limited by the number
of products — that is, lengths 10-15 weeks, where 100 percent of group’s products are available
per construction — then the alternative estimates are almost identical to the original estimate.
6.3 Cutting out close observations
The pattern of price changes in particular for the largest subsample, durables of grade 2, suggests
that the price reaction takes a few days to diffuse. While we do include a 4-day post-event
dummy to allow for adjustment time, it may be that a different lag is more appropriate. We
relax this by dropping observations for a symmetric window of 1-14 days around the event.
This “donut RD” is also useful to avoid any close-to-the-event effects before it occurs.9
Figure 7 shows the results in the same way as for the robustness check on window length
above. For each grade/durability, 1 to 14 observations were dropped for each product and new
9This is similar to the robustness check in Barreca et al. (2011) or Dahl et al. (2014).
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←− higher quality / lower quality −→ ←− higher quality / lower quality −→
Quality grade
Notes: On the left, for each grade of durable products the event effect is measured by using a “donut RD” that
symmetrically drops 1 to 14 daily prices around the event for all products. The solid circle and the symmetric
error bars around it show the original event estimate and its 95 percent CI. Grey plus-signs represent one
alternative estimate for each of the 14 donut RDs. Black hollow triangles show the mean of the 14 alternative
estimates. On the right, the same analysis is shown for non-durables.
estimates obtained. The grey plus-signs represent one donut sample each. The solid circles and
the lines show the original estimates. A hollow triangle gives the mean of all 14 donut sample
estimates per grade and type of product. Several results are outside the 95 percent CI of the
original estimate, and even the average result lies outside in some cases. However, the direction
of the price change remains the same and the size of the effect is stronger than in the original
estimates.
6.4 Degree of polynomial
Some of the graphs of the main results in Figure 3 exhibit complex patterns, which could make a
fourth-order polynomial necessary. As a robustness check to this choice, we have estimated the
model alternatively with polynomials of degree 1 to 5. Table 6 shows by grade and durability
the results for the post-event shift, 1[t > 0], resulting from each specification. Column (4)
reproduces the original estimates. Specifications where the highest-order polynomial term loses
significance are in normal font, those where the highest-order term is significant are put in bold
face. We give less weight in interpreting the robustness check to the specifications where the
highest degree of the polynomial is insignificant.
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Overall the results confirm our main results, although there is some variation. The term of
order 5 is only significant for durables grade 1; all other specifications in the for this group give
estimates that are very similar to the original estimate. Grade 2 durables, the largest group,
has only order up to term 2 significant, but the estimates do not vary much between them.
Grade-3-durables have estimates half as large for order 1 and 2, and are similar for 3 and 4,
although in those cases the largest order polynomial of the specification is not significant. For
durables grade 4, the estimates differ for order 1 and 2, but up to order 3 are significant, the
last one having again a very similar estimate as order 4. Grade 5 durables show no significant
results for the event effect.
For non-durables, all estimates are similar to the original ones when compared to the
polynomial specification where the highest-order is significant.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
Our analysis empirically evaluates the effect of exogenous product quality information provided
by a consumer protection agency in experience goods markets. Our identification approach
allows us to attribute the price changes to the quality disclosure by the consumer agency.
Theories of price signaling under asymmetric information predict that price distortions will be
reduced when quality is disclosed. Our results show a substantial effect of quality disclosure on
market outcomes for products which are tested by the agency.
Our cross-sectional results suggest that quality is reflected in prices, supporting the theoretical
models that emphasize price as an important quality signal that firms employ to overcome
asymmetric information problems. The dynamic estimates show that firms significantly change
the price when the test results are published. However, the increase of the price after the event
contradicts some of the main theoretical predictions of the asymmetric information literature
that predict a price decrease, especially for the high-quality products.
Results for products that are revealed to be of very bad quality have some tendency to
reverse the relationships we find between price and quality. Producers of bad quality could
imitate pricing of higher quality products to target consumers that are uninformed — in the
sense of not being aware of the product test results — and that still rely on price as a signal.
Product survival, which is higher than that for the worst products only for the best products,
is in line with the idea of such an imitation strategy being profitable.
Overall these results suggest positive welfare effects caused by large-scale quality disclosure
of information in experience goods markets. The increasing prices for products of very good and
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Table 6: Robustness check on polynomial
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Order 1 Order 2 Order 3 Order 4 Order 5
Durables
Grade 1 0.00919** 0.00982** 0.00731** 0.00787** 0.00059
(0.00198) (0.00187) (0.00264) (0.00255) (0.00316)
Grade 2 0.00929** 0.00883** 0.00892** 0.00877** 0.00938**
(0.00078) (0.00076) (0.00092) (0.00091) (0.00124)
Grade 3 0.00190 0.00158 0.00303* 0.00295* 0.00112
(0.00098) (0.00098) (0.00129) (0.00130) (0.00161)
Grade 4 0.00405** 0.00438** -0.00614** -0.00636** -0.00727**
(0.00157) (0.00158) (0.00229) (0.00231) (0.00275)
Grade 5 -0.00084 -0.00042 0.00295 0.00305 -0.00210
(0.00244) (0.00244) (0.00326) (0.00326) (0.00393)
Non-durables
Grade 1 0.03974 0.04162 0.07367* 0.07699* 0.05295
(0.02555) (0.02609) (0.03409) (0.03555) (0.03899)
Grade 2 0.00735 0.00668 -0.01667** -0.01637** -0.01452
(0.00460) (0.00465) (0.00612) (0.00614) (0.00771)
Grade 3 -0.05456** -0.05469** -0.04739** -0.04989** -0.05176**
(0.00832) (0.00848) (0.01207) (0.01224) (0.01469)
Grade 4 -0.02443** -0.02772** 0.00962* 0.01193** 0.00793*
(0.00636) (0.00475) (0.00474) (0.00352) (0.00318)
Grade 5 -0.00118 0.00107 0.01442 0.01383 0.00210
(0.01065) (0.01035) (0.01216) (0.01189) (0.01371)
Notes: Each Column shows the regression results for the RD model for the variable 1[t > 0], the main variable
of interest, for increasing polynomial order in variable time, t. Each line is for the subsample of one grade.
Column (4) contains the original estimates. Estimates resulting from specifications where the highest-order term
is insignificant are in normal font, those where the highest-order term is significant are put into bold face. The
top panel is for durable goods, the bottom panel for non-durables. Product-fixed effects are included. Standard
errors are clustered on calendar days. Standard errors are in parentheses below the coefficients. Significance
levels: *< 0.05, **< 0.01.
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good quality durables and decreasing prices for products of sufficient quality can be explained
by improved matching of consumers: they switch to products of better quality. The price
increase is not necessarily welfare reducing if consumers that value quality are willing to pay
for high quality. More accurate welfare assessment would require a model where we specify
the preferences of the consumers. However, the fact that bad quality products are overpriced
emphasizes once more the positive welfare effects of the tests.
Another aspect that should be considered when evaluating the overall welfare effects is
related to the changes in behavior of producers other than price. As shown in the discussion of
the literature, such quality disclosure is associated with quality improvements (Dranove and
Jin, 2010). Even though our data does not allow us to evaluate how quality evolves after the
test event, our exit results suggests that bad test grades drive some bad products out of the
market. This aspect is important especially when considering the importance of reputation in
signaling quality. This can be expected to hold especially for multi-product firms or firms that
sell many products under the same brand (umbrella branding), because they want to avoid
that the bad image transmits to the other products sold under the same name.
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Figure A.1: Sample Test Issue January 2017
Notes: The Figure shows a sample table collecting all results from a test of electric toothbrushes. We have
added a black frame around the row containing the aggregate test result. The yellow background, printing in
bold face and the red emblem of the magazine in the beginning of the row, which draw attention to the grades
are already in the original print.
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Table A.1: Data coverage of CPI weights (per mil)
2-digit 3-digit Sample
Name Weight Name Weight Weight N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
01 Food, non-alc. bev. 96.9 011 Food 84.87 0.13 15
012 Non-alcoholic bev. 11.98
02 Alcohol, tobacco 37.8 37.77
03 Clothing and footwear 45.3 031 Clothing 35.56 1.46 56
032 Footwear 9.78
04 Housing 324.7 324.7
05 Furniture, household 50.0 051 Furniture, lighting, floor cover 19.42 0.40 16
052 Household textiles 3.95
053 Household appliances 8.8 7.46 521
054 Glass-/tableware 3.68 0.57 44
055 Tools/appliances house/garden 6.45 2.45 206
056 Housekeeping goods/services 7.74
06 Health 46.1 061 Medical products/equipment 19.42 3.75 43
062 Outpatient services 20.22
063 Hospital services 6.49
07 Transport 129.1 071 Purchase of vehicles 34.66 2.05 47
072 Goods and services for vehicles 70.7 0.36 153
073 Transport services 23.69
08 Communication 26.7 081 Postal and parcel services 1.84
082 Telephones, communic. devices 2.66 2.66 175
083 Telecommunication services 22.22 10.09 61
09 Recreation, entertain-, 113.4 091 Photogr./info-processing equ. 14.18 10.12 854
ment, culture 092 Other durables recreation/culture 2.34 0.29 10
093 Oth. recreation/garden, pets 17.64 1.69 96
094 Recreational/cultural services 37.41
095 Print, writing, drawing 15.17
096 Package holidays 26.62
10 Education 9.0 9.02
11 Restaurant, accommod. 46.8 46.77
12 Miscellaneous 74.3 121 Personal care 22.88 3.53 244
123 Personal effects n.e.c. 6.16 0.72 195
124 Social protection services 14.17
125 Insurance services 24.68
126 Financial services n.e.c. 2.07
127 Other services n.e.c. 4.29
Σ 1,000 1,000 47.72 2,736
Notes: The Table shows the representation of the products in our data in the German CPI. Columns (1)-(3)
show code, name and weight for the categories of the top-level code; Columns (4)-(6) show the first subcategory
for those 8 of 12 top-level categories where our products fall into. The underlying matching of our product
types and the calculation of the corresponding weights representation in Column (7) was done on the lowest
level of product codes available in the weighting pattern, which are 645 categories. Column (8) reports the
number of observations that our data contain for each subcategory. Names of the categories are abbreviated
(see Destatis, 2019).
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Table A.2: Price-quality regression results
Grade Const. R-sq. N
2 3 4 5
Durables -0.0595 -0.2229** -0.3225** -0.2173** 1.1415** 0.0565 2503
(0.0465) (0.0473) (0.0523) (0.0551) ( 0.0451)
Non-durables 0.4525* 0.7566** 1.0434** 0.9360** 0.4726** 0.0799 233
(0.1949) (0.2217) (0.3965) (0.2579) (0.1803)
Notes: Regression estimates (and standard errors in parentheses) from regression of the prices relative to the
test mean prices on grade dummies. Separate regressions for durable and non-durable products were estimated.
Products of Grade 1 (Very good) are the reference group. Significance levels: *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01.
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